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                                   Abstracts 
 In this paper we model financial stability in small open economy enduring 
political uncertainty and operating under dual exchange markets, a  free 
exchange rate applicable to wide range of private capital transactions and 
controlled exchange rate applicable to some official transactions. The finding in 
the paper indicate, given that capital outflow is kept at minimal level there exist 
steady state equilibrium exchange rates. The level of initial official reserves 
determine the length of time needed for the process to adjust towards a new 
steady state equilibrium. The lower initial official reserve level is, the longer time 
is needed to recover from a shock and adjust towards a new equilibrium steady 
state. When  fiscal deficit and declining official reserves force the government to 
abandon the dual exchange system in favor of floating single exchange rate 
system, our model predict depreciation of foreign exchange rates is identical to 
domestic money growth.  
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  Financial stability in small open economy 
under political uncertainty 
 
1. Introduction 
The Comprhensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 between 
Southern rebel group and the government of Sudan ended a 21-year old 
civil war, by granting Southern Sudan semi-autonomy, leading to a 
referendum in early 2011 to choose full independence or remain within 
united Sudan. Under the CPA, during the transitional period, before the 
referendum, the two sides divide equally the revenue from oil produced in 
the South, which constitutes currently about 75 percent of foreign 
currency source for Sudan government in the North. Most analyst agree 
on likely vote will be for seperation, rather than for a unity. If that 
happens then the financial system in the remaining North-Sudan expected 
to undergo  substantial changes, as the government has not taken so far 
any serious  measures  accommodating the  big shock. What may make 
the matter even more worse for the North is that, currently Sudan is under 
US sanctions imposed since 1997, it targets 31 government owned 
companies and limits their access to US financial system and bars their 
use of US dollar in international financial transactions. Due to big drop in 
the official foreign currency reserves, caused mainly by the crude oil 
price fall in 2009, the government imposed in recent months quantitative 
restrictions on selling foreign currencies to individuals and business 
entities and  requires heavy documentations to legitimize transfer of 
foreign currencies. Currently oil revenue accounts about 75 percent of 
foreign currency revenue for the central government, and the rest comes 
from export of primary agriculture products and foreign investment 
flows. Since the beginning of the current year, speculation has been rising 
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by investors and currency traders that the government reserve level is 
deteriorating, adding more presure on foreign currency demand in the 
parallel market. To curb speculative effects on foreign exchange markets, 
the highest financial authority (the Central bank) decided to tighten 
control on exchange bureaux by enforcing additional restrictions on 
foreign exchange sales and cracking down  on black marketeers for 
foreign currencies. As a result, the salient feature of Sudan foreign 
exchange market, at this point of time is dual foreign exchange markets, 
operating side by side, an official exchange rate, which is manged and 
determined by the central bank, and  freely floating parallel market, 
which is sensitive to speculations and rumors about the economic and the 
political situation in the country2.  
Since economic stability at the post-secession era depends on political 
stability and resolving contentious issues related to border identification, 
we exclude the senario of war conflict between the two sides even though 
the political situation in the country remains foggy at the current time, but 
still there is high likelihhod of the two sides reaching an agreement in 
favor of a limited economic cooperation at post-secession era, as the 
South crude oil needs to flow through  the pipe lines and refineries in the 
North, the only outlet for the South oil export at the current time3.  
 
The remaining parts of the paper structured as follows. In what follows, 
we will present an open economy macroeconomic model that combines 
various decision making by economic agents. Section three  includes 
proporties of steady state and stability conditions.The final section 
summerize the  findings of the paper. 
                                                           
2 The official exchange rate system  currently is a managed float system, in which the central bank 
calculates an indicative rate based on previous day transactions and intervenes in the market if quotes 
break away from  a plus/minus 3 percent margin around that rate. 
3 Infact, the impact of war  breakout between the two sides can be infered from the impact of massive 
capital flight from the country, which is included in our analysis.  
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2. The macroeconomic model 
 
The macroeconomic model made up of the optimal rules of the 
various decision-making agents in the economy. Of these agents, private 
sector producers choose output and input levels for both home goods and 
export goods. Inputs include both labour and imported producer goods. 
Firms also set how much of any export revenue to divert to the foreign 
exchange markets by under-invoicing export sales and over-invoicing 
import bills. Households choose how much of their total financial wealth 
to hold in domestic currency, and how much to hold in foreign currency. 
Finally, the government determines its fiscal stance and financing, and 
the rules for pricing and rationing in the official foreign exchange market. 
We will deal with each in turn, and then assemble the various decision 
rules into steady-state equilibrium conditions for the two parts of foreign 
exchange markets.  
 
i. Domestic producers’ decisions 
Domestic firms can produce for home consumption or export. 
Exports are exogenously determined, as they depend mainly on 
international terms of trade. Home goods (y) have a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with imported producer goods Ip and domestic labour 
Ly as the only inputs:  
 
 Y ≤ Ip(1-α) Lyα,               0 ≤ α ≤ 1               (1) 
 
It is assumed that there is a quasi-fixed exchange rate denoted as e, 
applicable to some official transactions, and a freely floating nominal 
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exchange rate, denoted as b, mainly applicable to parallel market 
transactions4. This latter rate takes whatever level is required  to achieve 
asset market equilibrium. In the remaining parts of the paper we will refer 
to the quasi-fixed rate as the official rate, and the free rate by the parallel 
rate. 
 
The domestic currency purchase price of imported producer goods is the 
foreign currency price  multiplied by the free exchange rate relevant 
for competitive purchases. Competitive purchases of imported producer 
goods will always be made at the parallel rate  b, since the government 
impose restrictions for purchases at the official rate.  
mP*
The government stipulate that private firms convert a portion, 
)10( << φ   of their export proceeds at the parallel rate b, and the 
remaining part at the official rate, e which is always lower than b.  
Despite foreign exchange regulations firms can divert additional 
export proceeds illegally at the parallel rate b, by under-invoicing export 
procceds. As a result, the decision of how much of export proceeds to 
surrender at the official rate versus the parallel rate depends on the size of  
φ , which will determines the amount of export proceeds to evade foreign 
exchange regulations. 
The income of domestic firms consist of revenue from goods produced 
for domestic consumption and revenue from export. The expenditure side 
includes imported capital goods and labour cost for both export and 
domestic consumption goods. It is also included in the expenditure side 
the cost of under-invoicing export revenue, which is assumed linear 
function of φ , or more specifically )2/(φ  . Thus, firms’ decision rules for 
all the choices above are found by maximising their profit function:  
                                                           
4 It is important to realize that the parallel market in this sense is not a black market because it is 
officially recognized market by the government, and basic reason for this is that the government want 
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{ } )2()]()1()2/(1([ * yxpmy LLWIbPXebYpMax +−−−+−+ φφφ  
 
With respect to Ly, Ip and Ф, subject to production technology 
constraint and to the usual non-negativity restrictions. The first order 
conditions for Ip, Ly and Ф are: 
 
bPLIP mypy
*)1( =− − ααα              (3) 
 
Py αY/ Ly = W                          (4) 
 
Φ = (1 – 1/π)                           (5) 
 
Where π = b/e, refers to the paralle rate premium, and  is the 
dollar value of import price. Concavity of equation (5) implies that, while 
rising premium induce diversion of foreign currency from the official 
market to the parallel market by under-invoicing export revenue, but in a 
decreasing rate due to higher penalty cost when the size of under-
invoicing increases.  
mP*
After a few manipulations and substitutions of equations (3) and 
(4) we get:  
 
)6()()( 1* −+= αα ypypmy LIwLIbPP  
 
When the ratio of capital and labour inputs combined in fixed 
proportions, equation (6) reduces to: 
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to deter emergence of black market for foreign exchange.  
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Thus, domestic inflation can be expressed as a function of imported 
inflation and domestic wage cost and the paralle rate:  
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Where a dot over a variable denotes change over time.  
Equation (3) can be rearranged to solve for imports of producer goods. 
Substituting for Py from equation (7) as well, the optimal level of 
imported producer goods is stated as:  
)9()1( YI p ασ −=  
 
)(21 mPwwhere ββσ +=  
where )( mpw is the ratio of  marginal productivity of labour and imported 
capital inputs used for home goods production. 
Since change in real exchange rate reflect change in the relative price of 
tradables to non-tradables, or )( * yX PePr = then change in the parallel  
exchange rate affect the real exchange through its effect on domestic 
inflation (equation 8). In this definition of real exchange rate the relation 
between real exchange rate and export defined as: .0)( >∂∂ rX , so that 
appreciation in real exchange rate induce non-oil commodity exports. 
 
ii. Household portfolio allocation:  
Households choose between domestic and foreign assets, a 
portfolio allocation decision. Households’ nominal financial asset 
portfolio H is assumed to consist only of domestic money holdings M, 
and foreign money holdings F5. Since households buy foreign currency F 
only in the parallel market, and therefore value it at the parallel exchange 
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rate b, the domestic currency value of households’ nominal wealth H can 
be expressed as:  
 
 H = M + bF                     (10) 
 
Let λ be the fraction of financial wealth H that households want to 
hold in foreign currency. Both foreign currency F and domestic currency 
M earn zero interest, but F will provide a return whenever the parallel  
rate b changes6. The fraction λ will therefore rise with the actual rate of 
increase in the parallel rate7.  
In equilibrium, desired holdings of foreign money λH must equal 
the actual stock bF of foreign money being held, so we can solve for H = 
bF/λ. Replacing H in equation (10) and rearranging to solve for M, and 
dividing both sides by, e, to convert to foreign currency values, valued at 
the official rate, so that: 
 
 m = [(1 – λ)/ λ)] π F                   (11) 
 
where m = M/ e. The fraction λ is a function of the rate of increase in 
parallel rate, but this can be broken down into appreciation of the official 
rate, , and of the parallel market premium eˆ πˆ . Under fixed official rate, 
parallel market rate change equal to change in the parallel premium rate. 
Thus letting )ˆ(πΛ  stand for the relationship of 
 (1 – λ)/ λ, and solving for πˆ  equation (11) can be expressed as:  
 
         )12(0)(ˆ <Ψ′Ψ= Fm ππ   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5  As the stock market is underdeveloped, its impact on domestic savings is negligable.  
6 A principal motive of holding domestic money despite its zero interest earning, because of zero risk 
of holding it.  
 
7 Lizondo (1987), and Dornbush (1983) use perfect foresight assumption as they assume that λ rise 
with the expected increase of the free rate. 
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Equations (11) and (12) represents the portfolio-balance or the 
asset market equilibrium condition. Equation (11) indicates that the 
higher the expected rate of increase of the parallell rate (depreciation), the 
lower is the ratio of domestic money to foreign currency holdings.  
 
iii. Government decisions 
The government determines much of the context for decisions of 
other agents in the economy, and also acts as a separate agent. For 
instance, the government decrees and administers a set of foreign 
exchange controls which regulate entry into the official exchange market. 
In this market the government buys foreign currencies from households at 
the official rate e, and allocates it to pay for government imports (G). The 
government can buy from only one source: private sector export revenue 
X.  
We assume that government spending G is entirely on imports, 
including payment of interest on foreign debt, and that no new foreign 
debt is incurred. Further, we assume that any of G that is not financed by 
taxes must be financed by borrowing from the Central Bank.  
The change in the stock of domestic money M, is equal to the 
change in central bank domestic credit, D, plus the change in (domestic 
currency value of) foreign currency reserves held by the government, eR. 
The change in domestic credit reflects government borrowing from the 
central bank to finance its deficit, G – T or (in foreign currency) g – t 
(where t=T/e, and g=G/e) that is,  
 
Rtg
RDm
&
&&&
+−=
+=
)(
)13(    
 
Since meM =)(  
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The value of R&  is determined in the official exchange market, to 
which we now turn.  
 
iv. Foreign exchange markets 
(a) The official reserves:  
The current account balance in the official market (for brevity we 
will call it official resrves)8, R& , is determined as a fraction of export 
revenue channelled through the official exchange market, ))1(( eXφ− , less 
government imports (G) all valued in foreign currency. Algebraically, the 
official reserves can be expressed as:  
 
)14()]()1[( grXR −Φ−=&   
 
Where r is the real exchange rate. Substituting for Φ (equal to (1-1/π)) 
from equation (5) yield the final form of the official reserves:  
 
)15())(( grXR −= π&  
Thus, the status of the official reserves is affected by the real exchange 
rate and the parallel rate premium. For example, as implied by equation 
(5) rising parallel rate premium affect official reserve balance inversely 
through the smaller proportion of export proceeds allocated to the official 
foreign exchange market. It can also be verified from equation (15), as 
adverse shock to export raise the parallel premium, balancing official 
cuurent account, , requires fiscal deficit reduction, (g).  )(R&
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 There are no capital account transactions in the official market.  
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(b) The parallel FX  market:  
After determining the official current account, the current account 
in the parallel market,  is determined by subtracting total imports 
(private sector and government), capital flight, and official reserves, from 
the total inflow of foreign currency to the economy:  
,F&
 
        )16()()( RCgIrXF p && −−+−=
 
where Ip is imports of producer goods, and C is the capital flight 
measured in foreign currency units. Since there is no commonly accepted 
definition of capital flight in the economic literature (Kant, 2002), in this 
paper we define capital flight in more broader terms as the outflow of 
capital from a country in response to risk and uncertainty in the economic 
policies of that country. As a result, given declining official reserves and 
increasing parallel rate premium invoke more stringent foreign exchange 
regulations and abalance of payment crisis posibility then change in 
capital flight depends on the deviation of parallel rate premium from a 
benchmark level that balance official current account. More formally, 
from equation (15) the premium level that balance official reserves 
 can be determined as: )0( =R&
] )(~ 0 gXR ==&π  
Given change in the ratio of capital flight to total private wealth, (a=C/H), 
depends on the location of the premium from its benchmark level, )~(π , 
then: 
)17(0)~( >′−= fforfa ππ   
Equation (17) imply change in the ratio of capital flight,  a, depends on 
the official reserve status, which depends on whether the premium is 
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above or below the benchmark level )~(π . Denoting )~( ππθ −=  then from 
(17) the following relations hold8: 
000
000
000
=⇒==
>⇒<<
<⇒>>
Rif
d
da
Rif
d
da
Rif
d
da
&
&
&
θθ
θθ
θθ
 
Taking into account total private financial wealth, (H= m + πF), and 
Substituting for R& , from equation (15) and Ip from equation (8) we get 
the final form of the current account balance in the parallel exchange  
market:  
 
)18())(()1()()11( FmaYrXF πθασπ +−−−−=&  
 
Equation (18) completes the model, which consist of the 
differential equations (12), (13), (15) and (18) in . To 
simplify, we reduce the differential equation system to three equations by 
substituting for 
πˆ,,, andRFm &&&
R&  into equation (13) giving  
)19())(( trXm −= π&  
 
The third differential equation is (12), is repeated here as:  
 
 )12(0)(ˆ <Ψ′Ψ= Fm ππ  
 
The dynamic system of the model now represented by the 
equations (12), (18), and (19). 
In the next section we illustrate the adjusment process of the 
economy when speculative effects and adverse shock hit the economy 
under the case of insufficient reserve level.  But before that we need to 
                                                           
8   since capital flight in our context is defined as outflow of foreign currencies due to continous 
deterioration of official reserves,  it  serve as a proxy  variable  for  political uncertainty. 
 
 13
investigate existance of steady state solution for the dynamic system of 
the model. 
 
Proposition: 
A sufficient condition for existance of steady state solution for the system 
of equations (12), (18), and (19) is that the size of capital flight should be 
as small as negligable, so that   in equation (18). 0→a
 
A prove of existence of a unique solution for the steady state values is 
given in the appendix of this paper. Analysis of the characteristic 
polynomial of the linear approximation of the equations (12), (18), and 
(19), shows that the dynamic model has one positive and two negative 
roots if the ratio of capital flight is small as negligable. That is, the steady 
state discussed above is a saddle-point solution, therefore the economy 
can (re-)converge to the steady state from a distance away. If the 
condition of  is not satisfied there is no guarantee for existance of 
sustainable unique solution for the state variables, 
0→a
mandF ,,π  . 
 
Assuming the parallel market always adjust to steady state, , the 
adjustment process of the economy is illustrated using phase diagrams of 
the equations (12) and (19), under two different cases: (a) At the pre-
secession period when speculation about official resrve depletion is 
rising; and, (b) At the post-secession era, represented by adverse export 
shock to the economy. 
0=F&
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 3-Dynamic Analysis 
It should be noted that political uncertainty in our context is due to the 
likelihood of the country split into two independent parts, resulting in a 
permanent adverse export shock to the economy in the North, which will 
lose substantial amount of oil resource. However, at the pre-secession 
period speculations are rising with regard to official resrves depletion and 
sustainabilty of the official exchange market. In the following we analyse 
the dynamics of the financial system under each of the two cases. 
 
(a) Speculative Effects: 
Currently, as the date of the refrendum to decide upon unity or seperation   
of the country is approaching, foreign reserves with the central bank hit 
low levels, as the public anticipation of future currency depreciation  
rises6. The  adjustment process in the financial system due to the rising 
demand on foreign currency in the parallel market is explained in figure 
(2). As indicated in the proposition, steady-state solution exist only if 
capital outflow is maintained at low levels. Given this condition is 
satisfied, the initial steady state equilibrium represented at pont d in 
figure (2). Rising demand for foreign currencies in the parallel market 
represented by upward shift in the parallel rate premium from point d to 
q. At point q  expanding spread between the official rate and the parallel 
rate aggrevates reserve loss and induces further anticipation of official 
rate devaluation, which will push the parallel rate premium at the point, g. 
When official reserves reach a minimum level at point g, the government 
resort to a devaluation of the official rate that brings the system to the  
point h. During the adjustment process from h to d, along the saddle path 
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some of the reserves previously lost is replenished. It should be realized 
that, the recovery process from points g to h and then to d, depends on the 
level of the intial official reserves, as the adjustment process is expected 
to take longer time, the lower is the official reserves level. In other words,   
when official reserve level is low, the distance between points g and h, 
becomes wider and that requires bigger devaluation of the official 
exchange rate to locate the system along the sadle path at point h. Thus, 
the adjusment process when official resrve level is low, or insufficient, is 
more costly in terms of the social cost  pertaining to the impact of official 
rate devaluation on income distribution and resource re-allocation. 
 
Figure (2): Speculative effects and insufficient reserves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
π
     g 
0πˆ =
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 According to the  IMF country report of 2009, Sudan foreign currency resrves declined from about 
q
s 
0=m&
m m
s
1π
1m
d   π  
h 
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(b) Perminant Export Shock: 
In case the referundum results comes in favor of seperation of the South,  
the economy in the North expected to undergo substantial changes as it 
loses large part of crude oil export. Given this situation hold, the 
adjusment process in figure (3) illustrates the impact of a perminant 
adverse shock in export which cause an upward shift in the  
schedule to . On impact, the depreciation of the parallel rate raise 
the premium level to the point B. The adjustment from B to N will be 
affected by reduction in the demand for domestic money in private assets 
portfolio and the government withdrawal from its reserves to sustain the 
official rate. However, by the time official resrves reach its benchmark 
minimum, the government resort to discrete devaluation of the official 
rate so that the system jumps from N to h, and then converge along the 
saddle path towards the new equilibrium at point d' with international 
reserves partially restored, along the new saddle path s’s’. It should be 
realized that for the adjustment process towards equilibrium level to be 
feasible it is required that initial reserve level must exceed the losses that 
take place during the transition, from points d to N; otherwise, a balance 
of payment crisis will take place. It is also to be noted that the new steady 
state solution at point d’ is maintained at higher parallel premium level, 
reflecting a wider spread between the two exchange rates at the steady 
state solution. Thus, the steady state premium level depends on size of the 
adverse export shock. If the shock is too big, in such away that it induces 
intolerable spread between the two exchange rates, the government is left 
with the only option of unifying the exchange rates by adopting free 
floating rate, to which we turn in the following section.  
0=m&
0=′m&
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
US$ 1.7 billion in 2006 to about US$ 390 million in 2009. 
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Figure (3): Export shock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c) Unification of Exchange Markets: 
Let us assume that due to expanding fiscal deficit and deteriorating 
official reserves the government decided to abandon the dual foreign 
exchange policy and liberalize its foreign exchange market by adopting a 
single exchange rate floating freely and applicable to all transactions. In 
order to investigate the behavior of the post-unification floating exchange 
rate we introduce some changes into the basic model. Under a floating 
exchange rate system, the government eases the foreign exchange rate 
restrictions by allowing the private sector to buy and sell foreign currency 
determined by supply and demand conditions. Given the exchange rate is 
now flexible, there is a unified exchange rate which will be denoted by 
π     N 
0=m&
0ˆ =π
m m
π
s
1π
  h 
  B 
0=′m&
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μ . Since the central bank no longer intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market the stock of official reserves is constant . Under the new 
foreign exchange system the change in domestic money supply is 
reflected only by change in domestic credit: 
)0( =R&
DM && = , therefore 
)20(ˆ)( m
m
tgm ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= μ&  
where μμ MmandTGtg =−=− ,/)()( . 
The condition for portfolio equilibrium under the floating exchange rate 
system is given by: 
)21()ˆ( Fm μΛ=  
Given the parallel market equilibrium condition still hold , the 
dynamic system of the model is now represented by the equations (20) 
and (21). In order to reduce the system into a single equation we invert 
equation (21) and substitute it into equation (20) to get: 
)0( =F&
)22()/()( mFm
m
tgm ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ Ψ−−=&  
where  0,,ˆ)/( 1 <Ψ′Λ=Ψ=Ψ −μFm
Since [ , we denote the growth in domestic nominal 
money (or domestic credit expansion) by 
] MMmtg //)( &=−
)(tη  so that equation (22) can be 
expressed as: 
)23()]/()([ mFmtm Ψ−= η&  
When domestic credit expands at a constant rate7 .)( ηη =t  
Equation (23) represents the evolution of domestic money growth under 
floating exchange rate system, and it indicates that in the steady-state 
 the rate of exchange rate depreciation is identical to domestic 
credit expansion
)0( =m&
8: 
                                                           
7 The condition of constant rate of domestic credit expansion is crucial for existance of stable 
equilibrium values of the state variables, M, F, and π . 
8 The size of the public deficit (g-t) or domestic credit expansion does not change between the two 
regimes of foreign exchanges because there is no effective open market operations that allows the 
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)24(ˆ * ημ =  
equation (24) predict that if fiscal deficit persist after the liberalization of 
foreign exchange system, depreciation of foreign exchange rate will be 
identical to domestic credit expansion.  
 
4. Concluding remarks: 
We set up a dynamic model capturing salient features of  small open 
economy enduring political uncertainty and operating under dual 
exchange rates,  a  free exchange rate applicable to a wide range of 
private capital transactions and quasi-fixed exchange rate applicable to 
officially sanctioned  transactions. The objective in the paper to assess 
financial stability in the economy, taking into account diminishing 
official foreign currency reserves, and political uncertainty that entails the 
likelihood of seperation of the country into two independent parts,  
invoking adverse perminant export shock. The finding in the paper 
indicate steady state  equilibrium exchange rate system can be attained 
given that capital flight remains at minimal level. The size of export 
shock determines the size of equilibrium exchange rate premuim 
(divergence of the free rate from the official rate), and the level of the 
initial official reserves determine the length of time for the process to 
adjust towards a new steady state equilibrium. The lower initial official 
resrve level is, the longer time is needed to recever from adverse shock 
and adjust towards a new equilibrium steady state. When  fiscal deficit 
and declining official reserves force the government to abandon the dual 
exchange system in favor of floating single exchange rate system, our 
model predict depreciation of foreign exchange rate is identical to 
domestic money growth.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
government to adjust its stock of money supply according to its reserve level. In otherwords, the 
government is always a buyer of foreign currency, not a seller of foreign currency. 
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Appendix 
Prove of the proposition
To establish existance of steady state solution fo r the system of equations: 
)12(0)(ˆ <′Ψ= ψππ Fm  
)18()()1()11( FmaYXF πασπ +−−−−=&  
)19()( tXm −= π&  
 
Linearizing equations (12), (18) and (19) around the steady state values of 
πandmF ,, ,  to give the following matrix equation: 
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the values of the partial derivatives in the Jaccobian matrix can be determined as 
follows: 
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A necessary condition for a saddle-point solution is that the determinant of the 
Jaccobian matrix be positive: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 0ˆˆˆ >−+−−−= πππππ πππ mFmFFmmFmFmFJ FFmmmFFmmF &&&&&&&&&&&&  
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Since the determinant of the Jaccobial matrix is positive, either there are two 
roots that are negative and the third is positive, or all the three roots are positive. 
In the latter case the steady state is unstable. To rule out instability we analyse 
the characteristic polynomial P(r) of the Jaccobian matrix: 
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Where r is a characteristic root of the equation system. The polynomial 
properties include: 
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If the sum of the cross products )0( 1 <ν then at least one of the three roots 
is negative, and the case of instability is ruled out. Using the equation for 
1ν and the determinant equation, we can show that: 
[ ] 00ˆˆˆ1 ><−+−= ππππ πππν FifmmF mmF &&&&  
the condition of , is satisfied only if , which is the case that  0>πF& 0→a
rules out the possibility of an unstable solution, and leaves only the 
saddle point solution. 
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